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Abstract
Untraceability of vehicles is an important require-
ment in future vehicle communications systems. Unfor-
tunately, heartbeat messages used by many safety ap-
plications provide a constant stream of location data,
and without any protection measures, they make track-
ing of vehicles easy even for a passive eavesdropper.
One commonly known solution is to transmit heartbeats
under pseudonyms that are changed regularly in or-
der to obfuscate the trajectory of vehicles. However,
this approach is effective only if some silent period is
kept during the pseudonym change and several vehi-
cles change their pseudonyms nearly at the same time
and at the same location. Unlike previous works that
proposed explicit synchronization between a group of
vehicles and/or required pseudonym change in a des-
ignated physical area (i.e., a static mix zone), we pro-
pose a much simpler approach that does not need any
explicit cooperation between vehicles and any infras-
tructure support. Our basic idea is that vehicles should
not transmit heartbeat messages when their speed drops
below a given threshold, say 30 km/h, and they should
change pseudonym during each such silent period. This
ensures that vehicles stopping at trafﬁc lights or moving
slowly in a trafﬁc jam will all refrain from transmitting
heartbeats and change their pseudonyms nearly at the
same time and location. Thus, our scheme ensures both
silent periods and synchronized pseudonym change in
time and space, but it does so in an implicit way. We
also argue that the risk of a fatal accident at a slow
speed is low, and therefore, our scheme does not seri-
ously impact safety-of-life. In addition, refraining from
sending heartbeat messages when moving at low speed
also relieves vehicles of the burden of verifying a po-
tentially large amount of digital signatures, and thus,
makes it possible to implement vehicle communications
with less expensive equipments.
1. Introduction
Security in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
is a topic of increasing theoretical and practical inter-
est. European and American projects to implement
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure
(V2I) communications and thereby improve safety-of-
life are progressing steadily [1, 2, 3, 4]. As deployment
decision points for these projects draw nearer, the pro-
vision of adequate security mechanisms will be an im-
portant consideration for policy-makers.
In addition to the usual security requirements of
conﬁdentiality, authentication and integrity, VANET se-
curity typically presents an additional requirement, that
of privacy. Informally, the privacy requirement repre-
sents a user’s expectation that only appropriately autho-
rized parties will be able to determine where he or she
was at a given time. This informal deﬁnition may be
formalized in many ways, and the deﬁnition of appro-
priately authorized parties may vary according to the
circumstances and from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (or auser may expect that no entity can track them at all).
As messages sent by the vehicles within the
VANET may contain meta-information that endan-
gers the privacy of the drivers, vehicle communica-
tion systems must satisfy the following two properties:
pseudonymity and unlinkability. Pseudonymity means
that identiﬁers in a message do not directly refer to the
sender of the message, so an eavesdropper cannot eas-
ily determine the real identity of the sender. Unlinka-
bility means that it is made difﬁcult for an attacker to
determine that two messages have come from the same
vehicle. This second property is necessary to preserve
privacy in the sense of our informal statement above be-
cause a physical observation of a vehicle at point A, and
the ability to link its transmissions at A to transmissions
at B, would allow an attacker to determine that the vehi-
cle had also been at point B. Note that we do not address
short-term linkability which is required in order to im-
plement vehicle safety applications.
Making the security subsystem designer’s job more
complicated, most proposed V2X communications sys-
tems make use of an additional type of highly privacy-
threatening message, known as the heartbeat (in Amer-
ica) or beacon (in Europe) message (see [5] for an ex-
ample). This message is sent with a high frequency
(10 Hz is often recommended) and contains the vehi-
cle’s current position and velocity, in order to improve
the information that other drivers have about the traf-
ﬁc conditions in their immediate vicinity. An attacker
can therefore attempt to trace a vehicle, and thereby
break its location privacy, by “joining the dots” between
two heartbeat messages with the same identiﬁer (which
we call syntactic linking) or by constructing a trajectory
through a consistent series of (position, velocity) pairs
(which we call semantic linking). The challenge to the
security subsystem designer is to make these kinds of
tracing as hard as possible.
This paper makes two main contributions: First, in
Section 2, we provide a breakdown of the requirements
that a system must address in order to provide privacy.
The aim is to provide an analytical framework that fu-
ture researchers can use to concisely state which aspects
of privacy a new proposal does or does not address.
Second, we propose an approach for implementing
mix zones that does neither require extensive RSU sup-
port nor complex communication between vehicles, and
that does not endanger safety-of-life to any signiﬁcant
extent, while providing both syntactic mixing and se-
mantic mixing (in the language of Section 2). To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst proposal that provides for
semantic mixing while at the same time addressing the
safety-of-life concerns that naturally arise when a vehi-
cle tries to obscure its path. The key insights are simply
that vehicles traveling at a low speed are less likely to
cause fatal accidents, and that vehicles will be traveling
at a low speed at natural mix-points such as signalled
intersections. The main body of experimental work in
this paper is therefore an investigation of the conse-
quences for the untraceability of vehicles if they stop
sending heartbeat messages when their speed drops be-
low a certain threshold and change all their identiﬁers
after such silent periods. We call our scheme SLOW,
which stands for silence at low speeds. (We note that of
course SLOW is not a full solution to untraceability, as
it does not cover the safe use of silent periods at high
speeds; other techniques will need to be used to give
untraceability in this case).
Vehicles may of course choose to send heartbeats
if necessary for safety-of-life reasons, for example if
they sense an impending collision with a vehicle trav-
eling above the threshold speed. Still, a large number
of all vehicle interactions at intersections are non-life-
threatening, therefore, assuming that exception cases
can be properly deﬁned and implemented, intersections
(especially signalled intersections) seem to be a natural
choice as practical “zones of silence” where large num-
ber of vehicles can mix. Hence, our dynamic mix zone
that is automatically created around vehicles stopped at
an intersection is likely to be maintainable in the great
majority of cases.
Our work is inspired by the same insights as the
work of [6]. However, [6] only addresses syntactic mix-
ing, not semantic mixing, and requires the use of signif-
icant infrastructure. By replacing [6]’s cryptographic
mix zones with zones of silence we address semantic
mixing and infrastructure requirements simultaneously.
This paper has the following structure: We start
by introducing our overall analytical framework in Sec-
tion 2. We then survey previous work in Section 3.
Next, in Section 4, we introduce our attacker model and
our proposed solution, and in Section 5, we present the
results of our experiments showing that our approach
does indeed make tracing of vehicles hard for the at-
tacker, and that it is usable in the real world. Finally,
Section 6 presents conclusions and suggestions for fur-
ther research.
2. Framework
Any system that aims to provide privacy for vehi-
cles must address the following areas:
Syntactic privacy. In brief, all vehicles that use
pseudonyms must change those pseudonyms from time
to time. This area includes:
N1 Pseudonymity: An identiﬁer that is available to an
eavesdropper must not be directly linkable to thevehicle (for example, it must not contain the VIN,
thedriver’sname, oranythingelseaneavesdropper
might know).
N2 Change of identiﬁers: Identiﬁers must change with
some frequency1.
N3 Local synchronization of change of identiﬁers: All
identiﬁers, up and down the network stack, must
change simultaneously. (This is not a communica-
tions issue as such, but a local engineering issue;
however, it must be addressed).
N4 Cooperative synchronization of change of identi-
ﬁers or syntactic mixing: A vehicle in an observed
area must change its identiﬁer at the same time as
at least one other vehicle and the two (or more)
changing vehicles must do so in a way that allows
semantic privacy as deﬁned below2.
N5 Pseudonym use: This covers two intermingled ar-
eas:
N5.1 Pseudonym format: What cryptographic
mechanism is used by psuedonym owners to
authenticate that they are valid units within
the system?
N5.2 Pseudonym issuance and renewal: How are
pseudonyms issued? How does a vehicle
avoid running out of them? (The answer to
this may involve the identiﬁer change fre-
quency, N2.) What assumptions are neces-
sary about the infrastructure to ensure that a
vehicle is not left without pseudonyms?
Semantic privacy. This captures the idea that vehicles
must not be traceable by reconstructing the trajectories
implied by their heartbeat messages. This area includes:
M1 Semantic unlinkability: A vehicle’s stream of
heartbeat messages must be interrupted at some
frequency for some period of time.
M2 Semantic mixing: Semantic unlinkability is valu-
able mainly in so far as it creates ambiguity for an
attacker about whether a resumed stream of heart-
beats comes from vehicle A or vehicle B.
Robust privacy. This captures how misbehaving entities
within the system may affect privacy and security. This
area includes:
1The frequency of change that provides privacy to the level ex-
pected by a user will in practice often depend on local regulation.
2Otherwise, an attacker who sees, for instance, identiﬁers
(A;B;C;D) at time t and (A;B;C;E) at time t +1 will know that D
and E refer to the same vehicle.
R1 Privacy-preserving bad-actor removal: How is a
misbehaving entity removed? Does this removal
affect the privacy of its transmissions before it be-
gan to misbehave? Does its removal affect the pri-
vacy of other entities in the system?
R2 Privacy against insider attacks: How is privacy
protected against bad actors in Law Enforcement
or at a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA)?
This paper explicitly contributes in the area of syn-
tactic mixing (N4), semantic mixing (M2), and seman-
tic unlinkability (M1). Our results are based on the as-
sumption that pseudonyms are changed whenever our
criteria are met. This will be fairly frequent, on the or-
der of once every few minutes for urban driving, implic-
itly addressing N2. An identiﬁer change frequency this
high may require frequent reissuance of pseudonyms,
limiting the choices possible in areas N5.1 and N5.2.
To the best of our understanding, our proposal is com-
patible with any reasonable solution for N1, N3, R1, or
R2.
3. Related Work
There are a number of studies of pseudonym
changes to assist syntactic unlinkability (N2). In [7],
a periodic change of certiﬁcates is proposed based
on the vehicle’s driving and DSRC properties such
as speed, transmission range, and transmission rate.
The authors determine in their setting on a highway
an appropriate time period for a certiﬁcate change of
around one minute. Further approaches suggest chang-
ing pseudonyms once the best opportunity is identiﬁed.
In [8], a vehicle ﬁrst assesses its environment and de-
termines how much uncertainty a pseudonym change
at a given time would cause to the attacker. Once the
level of expected uncertainty reaches a given threshold,
a pseudonym change is triggered. A thorough analy-
sis of the effectiveness of changing pseudonyms was
performed in [9], where the authors show that even if
pseudonyms are always successfully changed in an un-
observed zone, the adversary is still able to trace ve-
hicles with reasonable probability. The paper suggests
that the success probability of the attacker saturates at
around 0:6 for a strong adversary that observes more
than 50% of the road network due to the non-uniformity
of trafﬁc. An interesting result is that the success rate
mainly depends on the attacker’s capabilities rather than
on trafﬁc density.
In [6], the authors suggest to construct mix zones
for vehicles by cryptographic means. They propose
to install such cryptographic mix-zones by deploying
a special RSU at places with high trafﬁc density suchas crossroads. Once a vehicle enters a cryptographic
mix-zone, they obtain a symmetric key from the RSU.
While the vehicle is inside of the cryptographic mix-
zone, all communication is encrypted and therefore an
adversary cannot read-out useful information (includ-
ing meta-information) from its messages. Vehicles in
the mix-zone forward the symmetric key to vehicles
that are in direct transmission range outside of the mix-
zone such that these vehicles are also able to decrypt
messages. Vehicles then change pseudonyms while be-
ing inside of the mix-zone. Another approach against
global attackers but without infrastructure support was
presented in [10, 11]. These papers suggest grouping
vehicles together (for a few seconds) and introducing
silent periods. Each vehicle group has a group leader
that broadcasts information while the other vehicles are
silent. Also, when vehicles change pseudonyms, they
introduceaperiodofsilenceinordertoreducetheavail-
able information for an attacker.
Another proposed approach provides multiple cer-
tiﬁcates in vehicles based on the combination of group
signatures and multiple self-issued certiﬁcates [12, 13].
The disadvantage is that On Board Units (OBUs) need
to perform expensive group signature veriﬁcation op-
erations, and that OBUs are empowered to mount Sibyl
attacks. [14] uses group signatures to request temporary
certiﬁcates from a CA in an anonymous manner without
thedisadvantagesofthepreviousscheme, butatthecost
of an available connection to the CA. Our solution sug-
gested in the next section accounts for a global attacker
without the support of the RSU infrastructure.
4. Attacker Model and Proposed Solution
We assume a global attacker that can get mass cov-
erage. Conceptually, the attacker might be the RSU net-
work operator that has access to messages received by
all RSUs, or the attacker might have set up a network
covering an entire city3. This is clearly an extremely
powerful attack model, perhaps too powerful to be plau-
sible, but we use this because if the system is secure in
the face of this attacker it will be secure in the face of
other, weaker attackers too.
The attacker can use two basic mechanisms to link
transmissions from a vehicle: (1) linking pseudonyms
or other identiﬁers between heartbeat messages (syn-
tactic linking), and (2) using the position and velocity
information in the heartbeat messages to reconstruct the
trajectory of the vehicle (semantic linking).
We assume no supporting infrastructure in terms of
3FraunhoferInstitutehasestablishedthatthehardwarecost(ignor-
ing the backhaul connections) to set up receivers covering all 900 km2
of Berlin is about 250;000 Euros.
an RSU network, therefore, vehicles must have a strat-
egy to create their own mix zones, and that strategy
must work even in the case where the attacker has 100%
coverage. The defender’s mechanism is to turn off ra-
dio transmissions (to make semantic linking difﬁcult)
and change pseudonyms (to make syntactic linking dif-
ﬁcult) while the radio is turned off without endangering
safety of life.
More precisely, the proposed solution, which we
call SLOW for silence at low speeds, works as follows.
We choose a threshold speed vT, say vT = 30 km/h. A
vehiclewillnot broadcastanyheartbeatmessage, orany
other message containing location or trajectory data in
the clear, if it is traveling below speed vT, unless this
is necessary for safety- of-life reasons. If the vehicle
has not sent a message for a certain period of time,
then it changes pseudonyms (identiﬁers at all layer of
the network stack and related certiﬁcates) before the
next transmission. Trafﬁc signals in a crowded urban
area seem like an ideal location for such a pseudonym
change: whenever a crowd of vehicles stop at a traf-
ﬁc signal, they may go into one of several lanes, they
may choose to turn or not turn, and so on. Thus, we
create mix-zones at the point where there is maximum
uncertainty about exactly where a vehicle is and exactly
what it is going to do next. This is also a safe set of
circumstances under which to stop transmitting. Only
5% of pedestrians struck by a vehicle at 20 km/h die
[15] while at 50 km/h the ﬁgure is 40%. Presumably,
vehicle-to-vehicle collisions where both cars are travel-
ing at 30 km/h result in even fewer fatalities. Situations
can be deﬁned as exceptions. For instance, if vehicle A
is stopped at a signal, but vehicle B coming up behind
it emits a heartbeat that lets vehicle A know that there
is a risk of a collision, then vehicle A can send out a
heartbeat to warn vehicle B to brake. We note that our
simulations do not include this exception case, because
in practice these cases come up only rarely. Future re-
search based on SLOW will investigate this exception
case in greater detail. We also note that an attacker can
abuse exception cases to break the silent period, but this
attacker (unless it is an inside attacker) can be tracked
down by standard methods and revoked.
Besides being very simple to implement, SLOW
has other advantages. Trafﬁc jams and slow trafﬁc leads
to a large amount of vehicles in transmission range and
therefore requires extensive processing power to ver-
ify the digital signatures of all incoming heartbeat mes-
sages. By refraining from sending heartbeat messages,
SLOW avoids the necessity of extensive signature ver-
iﬁcations in trafﬁc jams and slow trafﬁc, and thus, re-
duces hardware cost. A more detailed analysis of the
impact on computation complexity, as well as the levelof privacy and safety provided by our scheme will be
presented in the next section.
5. Analysis
5.1. Privacy
It must be intuitively clear that a vehicle frequently
sending out heartbeat messages is easy to trace, but to
the best of our knowledge, no accurate experiment con-
ﬁrms this statement in VANET settings. As ﬁeld ex-
periments cannot be done due to the lack of envisioned
VANET infrastructure, we carried out simulations to
measure the level of traceability in an urban setting. We
used the SUMO [16] simulation environment, as it is
a realistic, microscopic urban trafﬁc simulator. SUMO
was set to use a 100 Hz frequency for internal update of
vehicle position and velocities, and every Nth position
(N depending on the heartbeat frequency) was consid-
ered to be available to the attacker as a heartbeat.
Note that tracing vehicles in an urban setting is es-
sentially a multitarget tracking problem, which has an
extensive literature, however, mostly related to radar
development in the ﬁelds of aviation and sailing [17].
Yet, thefollowingtrackingapproach, consistingofthree
steps, can be adopted to the vehicular setting too: First,
the actual position and speed of the targets are recorded
by eavesdropping the heartbeat messages. Based on the
position and speed information, a predicted new posi-
tion is calculated, which can be further reﬁned by the
helpof side informationsuch as thelayout of thestreets,
lanes etc. At the next heartbeat, the new positions are
eavesdropped and matched with the predicted positions.
We implemented an attacker that tracked the ve-
hicles in the SUMO output based on the tracking ap-
proach described above. The attacker uses the last two
heartbeat information to calculate the acceleration of
the vehicles making the prediction of the next position
more accurate. The vehicles are tracked from their de-
parture to their destination. Tracking is considered suc-
cessful, if the attacker has not lost a target through its
entire journey.
The results of the tracking of 50 vehicles are shown
in Figure 1. As we can see, if the beaconing frequency
is 5-10 Hz, which is needed for most of the safety ap-
plications, then 75-80% of the vehicles are tracked suc-
cessfully. By evaluating the unsuccessful cases, we ob-
served that the target vehicles were lost at their desti-
nations. More precisely, in the vast majority of the un-
successful cases, when the target vehicle V1 arrived to
its destination and stopped sending more messages, if
an other vehicle V2 was in its vicinity, then the attacker
continued tracking V2 as if it was V1. We counted this
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Figure 1. Success rate of an attacker per-
forming vehicle tracking by semantic linking of
heartbeat messages when no defense mecha-
nisms are in use.
as unsuccessful case, because the attacker erroneously
determined the destination of the target vehicle (i.e.,
it concluded that the destination of V1 was that of V2,
and those two destinations have virtually never been the
same). However, during the movement of the target ve-
hicles (i.e., before they reached their destination), the
attacker was able to track them with a remarkable 99%
success rate. This conﬁrms that semantic linking is a
real problem.
In any case, from a privacy point of view, a system
where the users are traceable with probability 0.75-0.8
is not acceptable. Our proposed silent period scheme,
where the vehicles stop sending heartbeat message be-
low a given speed, mitigates this problem. It must be
clear that the tracking algorithm described above does
not work when the vehicles stop sending heartbeats reg-
ularly. Yet, the attacker may use other side information,
such as the probability of turning to a given direction
in an intersection, to improve the success probability of
tracking despite the absence of the heartbeats. Thus, we
need a new attacker model that also accounts for such
side knowledge of the attacker.
We formalize the knowledge of the attacker as fol-
lows (for a summary of notations the reader is referred
toTable1): First, eachintersectionismodeledwithabi-
nary matrix J, where each row corresponds to an ingress
lane and each column corresponds to an egress lane of
the intersection, and Jij (the entry in the i-th row and
j-th column) is 1 if it is possible to traverse the intersec-
tion by arriving in ingress lane i and leaving in egress
lane j. As an example, consider the intersection shown
in Figure 2 and its corresponding matrix J deﬁned inTable 1. Notation
vT threshold speed
J junction descriptor matrix
m number of lanes towards the junction
n number of lanes from the junction
T probability distribution of the target’s lanes
W number of waiting vehicles per lanes
w number of waiting vehicles in the junction
L list of egress events
lD decision of the attacker
ˆ l the target’s real egress event
LS list of suspect events
Figure 2. An example intersection, the corre-
sponding matrix is given in (1)
(1).
J =
0
B B
B B
@
0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
1
C C
C C
A
(1)
Second, we assume that the accuracy of GPS re-
ceivers does not permit to decide with certainty which
lane of a road a given vehicle is using. Therefore, we
also assume that the attacker knows on which road a tar-
get vehicle enters the intersection, but it does not know
which ingress lane it is using. Nevertheless, the attacker
may have some a priori knowledge on the probability
of an incoming vehicle choosing a given ingress lane
on a given road in a given intersection; such knowledge
may be acquired by visually observing the trafﬁc in that
intersection for some time. These probabilities can be
arranged in an m dimensional vector T, where the i-th
element Ti is the probability of choosing ingress lane i
when entering the intersection on the road that contains
ingress lane i. As an example, consider the intersection
in Figure 2, and the vector
T = (0:6;0:4;1;0:8;0:2)
This would mean that vehicles arriving to the intersec-
tion on the road that contains ingress lanes 1 and 2
choose lane 1 with probability 0.6 and lane 2 with prob-
ability 0.4. Note that vehicles arriving on the road that
contains only ingress lane 3 have no choice, hence T3 in
this example is 1.
Third, when multiple possible egress lanes corre-
spond to a given ingress lane (i.e., there are more than
one 1s in a given row of matrix J), we assume that vehi-
cles choose any of those egress lanes uniformly at ran-
dom. For example, a vehicle arriving in ingress lane 1
of the intersection in Figure 2 can leave the intersection
in egress lane 4 or 5 with equal probability.
Finally, when the target vehicle arrives at an inter-
section, there may already be some other vehicles wait-
ing or moving below the threshold speed in that inter-
section. The number of such silent vehicles in ingress
lane i is denoted by Wi, and the m dimensional vector
containing allWi values is denoted byW. Note that due
to our previous assumption that the attacker is not al-
ways able to precisely determine the ingress lane used
by an incoming vehicle, it is also unable to determine
the exact values of all Wi’s; nevertheless, it can use its
experimental knowledge on the probabilities of choos-
ing a given lane, represented by vector T, to at least
estimate the Wi values.
Let us denote by L the list of vehicles that leave
the intersection (and thus restart sending heartbeats) af-
ter the target entered the intersection (and thus stopped
sending more heartbeats). More precisely, each element
Lk of list L is a (timestamp, road) pair (t;r) that repre-
sents a vehicle reappearing on road r at time t. The ob-
jective of the attacker is to decide which Lk corresponds
to the target vehicle. Let us denote by ` the list element
chosen by the attacker, and let `¤ be the list element that
really corresponds to the target vehicle. The attacker is
successful if and only if ` = `¤.
In theory, the optimal decision is the following:
` = argmax
k
Pr(LkjJ;T;W;L)
where Pr(LkjJ;T;W;L) is the probability of Lk being the
right decision given all the knowledge of the attacker.
However, it seems to be difﬁcult to calculate (or esti-
mate) all these conditional probabilities, as they have to
be determined for every possible intersection (J), num-
ber of awaiting vehicles in the intersection (W), and ob-
servation of egress events (L).0 2 4 6 8 10
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Figure 3. Success rate of our simple attacker in
a single intersection. Different curves belong
to different experiments with the total number
of vehicles given in the legend.
Hence, we assume a more simplistic attacker that
uses the following tracking algorithm: Let us denote by
w the total number of silent vehicles in the intersection
when the target vehicle arrives and stops sending heart-
beats. The attacker decides on the w-th element of L,
unless that entry surely cannot correspond to the target
(e.g., it is not possible to leave the intersection on the
road in the w-th element of L given the road on which
the target arrived to the intersection). When the w-th el-
ement of L must be excluded, the attacker chooses the
element that is the closest in the list L and that cannot
be excluded.
Our simple attacker model essentially assumes that
trafﬁc at an intersection follows the FIFO (First In First
Out) principle. While this is clearly not the case in prac-
tice, our attacker still achieves a reasonable success rate
in a single intersection as shown in Figure 3. One can
see, for instance, that when the total number of vehi-
cles is 100, the attacker can still track a target vehicle
through a single intersection with probability around 1
2.
Figure 4 shows the success rate of the attacker in
the general case, when the target traverses multiple in-
tersections between its starting and destination points.
As expected, the tracking capabilities of the attacker in
this case are worse than in the single intersection case.
The quantitative results of our simulation experiments
suggest that only around 10% of the vehicles can be
tracked fully by the attacker when the threshold speed
is larger than 22 km/h (approximately 6 m/s).
The effectiveness of the attacker depends on the
vT threshold speed and the density of the vehicles. In
general the higher the threshold speed at which vehicles
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Figure 4. Success rate of our simple attacker
in the general case, when the target traverses
multiple intersections between its starting and
destination points. Different curves belong to
different experiments with the total number of
vehicles given in the legend.
stop sending heartbeats, the higher the chance that the
attacker loses the target (i.e., the lower the chance of
successful tracking). Moreover, in a dense network, it
is more difﬁcult to track vehicles. Note, however, that
there is an important difference in practice between the
trafﬁc density and the threshold speed, namely, that the
threshold speed can be inﬂuenced by the owner of the
vehicle, while the trafﬁc density cannot be.
5.2. Effects on safety
The main objective of vehicular communications is
to increase road safety. However, refraining from send-
ing heartbeat messages may seem to be in contradic-
tion with this objective. Note, however, that we propose
to refrain from sending heartbeats only below a given
threshold speed, and we argue below that this may not
endanger the objective of road safety.
According to [15], only 5% of pedestrians struck
by a vehicle at 20 km/h die, while this ﬁgure is 40% at
50 km/h. In [18], it is shown that in a 60 km/h speed
limit area, the risk of involvement in a casualty crash
doubles with each 5 km/h increase in traveling speed
above 60 km/h. In [19], it is shown that 1 km/h change
in speed can inﬂuence the probability of an accident by
3.45%.
The statistical ﬁgures above show that at lower
speed the probability of an accident is lower too. This
is because usually vehicles go at lower speed in areas
where the drivers need to be more careful (hence thespeed limit). Thus, it makes sense to rely more on
the awareness of the drivers to avoid accidents at lower
speeds. On the other hand, at higher speeds, accidents
can be more severe, and warning from the vehicular
safety communication system can play a crucial role in
avoiding fatalities.
5.3. Effects on computation complexity
A great challenge in V2V communication deploy-
ment is the processing power of the vehicles [20]. The
most demanding task of the On Board Unit (OBU) is
the veriﬁcation of the signatures on the received heart-
beat messages. This problem can be partially handled
by not attaching certiﬁcates to every heartbeat message
[12], but it does not solve the problem of verifying the
signatures on the messages.
In principle, the heavier the trafﬁc, the more vehi-
cles are in each others communication range. More ve-
hicles send more heartbeats overwhelming each other.
The number of vehicles in communication range de-
pends on the average speed of the trafﬁc, assuming that
the vehicles keep a safety distance between each other
depending on their speed.
In Figure 5, the results of some simple calculations
can be seen showing the number of signature veriﬁca-
tions performed as a function of the average speed. In
this calculation, we assumed that vehicles follow each
other within 2 seconds. The communication range is
assumed to be 100 m and the heartbeat frequency is
10 Hz. It can be seen in the ﬁgure that, in a trafﬁc jam
on an 8-lane road, each vehicle must verify as many as
approximately 8,000 signatures per second. If SLOW
is used with a threshold speed of around 30 km/h (ap-
proximately 8 m/s), then the vehicles never need to ver-
ify more than 1,000 signatures per second. (assuming
all other parameters are the same as before). This ap-
proach also works well in combination with congestion
control where the transmission power is reduced in high
density trafﬁc scenarios. Our approach therefore makes
the hardware requirements of the OBU much lower and
enables the use of less expensive devices.
6. Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we proposed a simple and effective
privacy preserving scheme, called SLOW, for VANETs.
SLOW requires vehicles to stop sending heartbeat mes-
sages below a given threshold speed (this explains the
name SLOW that stands for “silence at low speeds”)
and to change all their identiﬁers (pseudonyms) after
each such silent period. By using SLOW, the vicinity of
intersections and trafﬁc lights become dynamically cre-
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Figure 5. Number of signatures to be veriﬁed
as a function of the average speed. The com-
munication range is 100 m, and the heartbeat
frequency is 10 Hz. Safety distance between
the vehicles depends on their speed.
ated mix zones, as there are usually many vehicles mov-
ing slowly at these places at a given moment in time. In
other words, SLOW implicitly ensures a synchronized
silent period and pseudonym change for many vehicles
both in time and space, and this makes it effective as a
location privacy enhancing scheme. Yet, SLOW is re-
markably simple, and it has further advantages. For in-
stance, it relieves vehicles of the burden of verifying a
potentially large amount of digital signatures when the
vehicle density is large, as this usually happens when
the vehicles move slowly in a trafﬁc jam or stop at in-
tersections. Finally, the risk of a fatal accident at a slow
speed is low, and therefore, SLOW does not seriously
impact safety-of-life.
We evaluated SLOW in a speciﬁc attacker model
that seems to be realistic, and it proved to be effective
in this model, reducing the success rate of tracking a
target vehicle from its starting point to its destination
down to the range of 10–30%. A possible future exten-
sion of our work would be to investigate further attacker
models and to study other metrics of privacy beyond the
one we used that is based on the success probability of
an attacker that attempts to track vehicles.
Possibilities for future research include the follow-
ing:
1. Reducing heartbeat rates as the vehicle’s speed re-
duces, rather than eliminating them altogether.
2. Further consider what the threshold speed should
be, and what the rules governing exceptions should
be, taking into account real-world data about in-tersection collisions. For example, although colli-
sions at 30 kmh are only occasionally fatal, a head-
on collision between two vehicles travelling at 30
kmh each is effectively at 60 kmh.
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